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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the potential role that the so-called “toxic
triangle” (Padilla et al., 2007) can play in undermining the processes around effectiveness. It is the
interaction between leaders, organisational members, and the environmental context in which those
interactions occur that has the potential to generate dysfunctional behaviours and processes.
The paper seeks to set out a set of issues that would seem to be worthy of further consideration within
the Journal and which deal with the relationships between organisational effectiveness and the threats
from insiders.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper adopts a systems approach to the threats from insiders
and the manner in which it impacts on organisation effectiveness. The ultimate goal of the paper is to
stimulate further debate and discussion around the issues.
Findings – The paper adds to the discussions around effectiveness by highlighting how senior managers
can create the conditions in which failure can occur through the erosion of controls, poor decision making,
and the creation of a culture that has the potential to generate failure. Within this setting, insiders can
serve to trigger a series of failures by their actions and for which the controls in place are either ineffective
or have been by-passed as a result of insider knowledge.
Research limitations/implications – The issues raised in this paper need to be tested empirically
as a means of providing a clear evidence base in support of their relationships with the generation of
organisational ineffectiveness.
Practical implications – The paper aims to raise awareness and stimulate thinking by practising
managers around the role that the “toxic triangle” of issues can play in creating the conditions by
which organisations can incubate the potential for crisis.
Originality/value – The paper seeks to bring together a disparate body of published work within the
context of “organisational effectiveness” and sets out a series of dark characteristics that organisations
need to consider if they are to avoid failure. The paper argues the case that effectiveness can be a
fragile construct and that the mechanisms that generate failure also need to be actively considered
when discussing what effectiveness means in practice.
Keywords Uncertainty, Organization effectiveness, Dysfunctional behaviours, Insider threats,
The toxic triangle
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
[…] effectiveness is not a concept but a construct. A concept is an abstraction from observed
events, the characteristics of which are either directly observable or easily measured […]
constructs […]. are constructed from concepts at a lower level of abstraction. The problem is
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that no one seems to be sure which concepts […]. are to be included in the construct of
effectiveness, or how they are to be related – (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983, pp. 363-364).
Some 30 years after Quinn and Rohrbaugh highlighted the abstract nature of
effectiveness, some might still question whether the construct has been developed
sufficiently to provide answers to the questions that were outlined in their early paper.
In particular, the question of which concepts make up the construct of effectiveness is
still a key issue. The argument developed in this paper is that organisations need to
consider some of the darker elements that shape organisational performance and
accountability if they are to comprehensively understand the relationships between
effectiveness and failure. Effectiveness is clearly a multi-layered issue: it transcends
disciplinary and functional boundaries; it evolves over space and time; and it is often
seen as an essentially perceptual process. In many cases, however, we only recognise
effectiveness by its absence – that is, when organisations fail and especially when they
fail in a catastrophic manner. It is invariably the case that at the point of failure, we
judge the organisation to have been ineffective. However, this remains a generally
binary view of the effectiveness construct when, in reality, it covers a spectrum of
systems states. One only has to look at the ways in which politicians recast the
boundaries of their policies to see how fluid that notion of effectiveness actually is.
The debates that invariably surround the success of the foreign policy of countries
provides us with several examples of the ever-changing boundaries of effectiveness. The
descent of Iraq into a civil war, the emergence of Islamic State as a potent terrorist force
(and one that some might even refer to as an emergent nation state), and the increasingly
globalised nature of terrorism, all point to the temporal dynamics of effectiveness, the
replacement of one set of policy problems with another (often expressed as blowback;
Bergen and Reynolds, 2005; Pena, 2002; Simpson, 1988), and the embedded nature of error
cost and incubation in shaping organisational performance (Collingridge, 1984; Turner,
1976). These are complex policy problems around effectiveness that do not lend
themselves to simple solutions. Ashby’s (1958, 1962) Law of Requisite Variety highlights
the need to manage variety in the system with sufficient variety in controls and there are
lessons here for the ways in which organisations seek to achieve effectiveness. A starting
point for dealing with such variety is to adopt more holistic and multi-disciplinary
approaches to dealing with effectiveness.
Sparrow and Cooper (2014) have advocated a more multi-disciplinary approach towards
dealing with the range of challenges facing organisational effectiveness. As a response to
that challenge, this paper outlines elements of the darker side of organisational effectiveness
by focusing on a range of issues that have the potential to move the organisation into a
state of crisis and which also have the issues of people and performance at their core.
The first aim of this paper is to try and outline some of the relationships between risk
and effectiveness. This is a potentially large agenda issue and so the focus here is on
starting a set of debates around these issues and to do so in a manner that recognises the
symbiotic nature of risk and effectiveness. A particular focus in this paper is on what has
been termed the “toxic triangle” (Padilla et al., 2007) in which leaders (and, by logical
extension, senior managers) can create an environment in which the potential for crisis is
generated, or where other organisational members can by-pass lax controls to create
harm. It is the contention here that many crises within organisations are self-generated by
those very people who are charged with making the organisation effective. In part, this
arises from the ambiguous nature of effectiveness itself but also from the central role that
is played by uncertainty within organisational decision making.
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The second aim of this paper is to explore the darker side of organisational effectiveness
and, in particular, to consider the role played by insider threats in the generation of failure.
The paper grounds the discussion within the processes of effectiveness before examining
the potential role played by “dark triad” personality factors (Jonason et al., 2012, 2014;
Paulhus andWilliams, 2002) in shaping dysfunctional behaviours that can then lead to the
erosion of effective organisations.
Framing effectiveness
Management’s abilities to deal with uncertainty are critical to the ways in which
effectiveness is framed. The greater the level of uncertainty within the environment, the
greater the amount of variety will be required around organisational controls and
information management systems in order to manage it. To an extent, organisational
contingency plans reflect that process, but they are invariably constrained by the
assumptions that managers make about the potential scenarios that they face. Uncertainty
is also a key factor in managing the performance and behaviours of people within the
organisation. The misbehaviours of staff will have an impact on effectiveness, as will the
more “heroic” responses that are made by individuals to bring failing systems back under
control (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Reason, 2008). In both extremes of behaviour,
uncertainty is a key factor in shaping the “local” dynamics of effectiveness at specific
points in space and time. By responding to one set of challenges – either structural or
human – organisations risk creating sensitivities to other forms of disturbance (Hodge and
Coronado, 2007; Streatfield, 2001; Tenner, 1996; Tsoukas, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002).
This particular dynamic also calls into question the role and nature of expert judgements in
shaping decisions around effectiveness.
There are several additional issues that are raised in the paper by Quinn and
Rohrbaugh (1983) that have resonance for present discussions within this Journal as well
as within the broader Academy. They also questioned a range of processes around the
temporal dynamic of effectiveness, the central role of values in determining the key
parameters of effectiveness, and the manner in which changes in the perceptions of
effectiveness over time need to be incorporated into any discussion of what the construct
means in practice (see also Quinn and Cameron, 1983). These issues, and the relationships
between them, are often nested, and changes in one of the parameters of effectiveness can
have a significant impact on other elements. For example, the values held by organisational
members will serve to shape both the decision-making and sense-making processes that
operate around the management of both people and processes. Values and assumptions
also shape the ways in which we frame and evaluate effectiveness and this impacts upon
the manner in which we then structure organisational controls to allow that effectiveness to
be achieved. Values often change over time and they also interact with the dominant
cultural artefacts that have evolved within the organisation to create the conditions in
which people work. Values also invariably play a central role in shaping how different
organisational actors and external stakeholders perceive the nature of effectiveness at
different points in time and space and also at the points of interaction with elements of the
organisation and its wider network. Our experiences and worldviews serve to shape the
ways in which we judge the effectiveness of our own actions, the processes through which
those actions are enacted, and the (cognitive) frames that we use to shape (or curtail) the
parameters of our decision making around the achievement of effectiveness. Thus, when
we look at effectiveness through the context of the key people and processes that prevail at
any point in space and time, we are only seeing a snapshot of a wider set of complex
dynamics at work within the “system”.
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Figure 1 highlights some of the issues surrounding effectiveness. This is only a partial
snapshot of the issues and is not meant to be inclusive of all of the elements of the
construct. The emphasis within Figure 1 relates to the ways in which uncertainty interacts
with knowledge, expertise, and culture to create a set of challenges to achieving and
sustaining effectiveness. The ways in which an organisation accumulates, communicates,
and implements its knowledge is also a key factor in shaping the performance of the wider
system (Ditillo, 2004; Tsoukas, 1997; Tucker, 2014). The uncertainty that surrounds this
process and the gaps that exist between the task demands and the control mechanisms,
will serve to generate the potential for failure that will evolve over time and space and will
be further shaped by the prevailing culture of the organisation. In essence, this Rubic’s
cube of effectiveness generates a fundamental challenge for organisations. A failure to
adapt to changing task demands will create fractures in controls and any new innovations
may well generate emergent conditions that by-pass existing controls. In both cases,
effectiveness will be eroded, although it may remain hidden until a disturbance generates
perturbations that expose these vulnerabilities (Tenner, 1996; Turner, 1976). Management
actions remain at the core of this process – both in terms of their inactions around the
forces of incubation as well as their direct actions in creating the root causes of failure
(Reason, 1997; Turner, 1978, 1994).
Given the complex nature of effectiveness, it needs to be framed as a multi-level issue
that requires analysis throughmultiple, multi-disciplinary lenses. As such, it requires us to
consider how the construct is differentiated at different levels within the organisation and
how the differences in the approaches towards it, at each of those levels and across
locations, can generate fractures in control and governance (see e.g. Piattoni, 2009;
Rousseau, 1985) and erode performance (Eichener, 1997; Scharpf, 1997; Vogel, 1997). The
result is the creation of gaps in organisational controls that allow perturbations within the
system to by-pass multiple layers of defences. Against such a background, risk and
uncertainty are central components of the processes that shape effective organisations. By
developing and articulating the nature of the various “logics” that shape both the
“constraints and opportunities” (Engelen, 2001) open to organisations, it is possible to
begin to outline a set of “dark” issues that have the potential to undermine effectiveness.
The darker logics of ineffectiveness
There are several issues that arise out of a discussion of the potentially negative
aspects around effectiveness and some of these are highlighted in Figure 2. This is not
meant to be a comprehensive list of organisational elements and processes, but rather
an attempt to highlight some of the parameters of a research terrain that explores the
Knowns and
Unknowns Knowledge Expertise
ValuesEffectivenessUncertainty
Risk Time and
Place
Culture
Figure 1.
Framing
effectiveness
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relationships between effectiveness and ineffectiveness (expressed here in terms of risk,
crisis, and failure). At the core of these relationships are four issues that serve to shape
the rest of the landscape.
The first of these relates to the processes around the management of people.
The manner in which human resources can serve as either an enabler of effectiveness,
or a key factor in undermining it, is a central element of the development of the wider
logics of effectiveness. People within the organisation will help to create and shape the
culture that prevails within it and, whilst this may be supportive of effectiveness,
it may also be responsible for developing ways of working that prove to be corrosive
and damaging (see e.g. Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999).
The second element relates to the ways in which the organisation functions as a
holistic system. By focusing on elements of organisational processes, we invariably
miss the subtle interactions between elements of the system that can ultimately bring
about the conditions for failure. Our abilities to manage such emergent conditions also
feeds back into the ways that we recruit, select, and train organisational members.
This is especially problematic when working in a multi-national context. These extended
organisational linkages operate across space, place, and time to generate a set of challenges
around the effectiveness of organisational controls.
The impacts of space, place, time on organisational performance, along with the
creation and maintenance of controls, constitute the third and fourth elements of the
intellectual landscape over which effectiveness is ultimately to be framed. Space, place,
and time increase the potential for emergent properties to generate conditions that lie
outside of the “normal” parameters that are subject to organisational controls. This, in
turn, creates conditions that challenge the worldviews of those who control the system
and increases the task demands (especially around information provision), which then
leads to impaired performance. This combination of new properties, problems around
sense making, and the distributed nature of the organisation’s employees can create
further problems around control. The issues raised in Figure 2 represent a broad set of
challenges that are raised by considering the opposite side of the effectiveness
construct. Invariably, our present discussions will be focused on a limited set of these
issues. The paper considers a particular “golden thread” of issues that have relevance
Organizational
Effectiveness
Human
Resources
Systems
Perspectives
Time, Place,
Space
Organisational
Control
Dynamic
Capabilities
Training and
Development
Organisational
Misbehaviours
Holistic vs Reductionist
Approaches
Interactions
(Coupling and
Complexity)
Emergent
Conditions
Management
Decision MakingStorming
Expert
Judgements
Knowledge
Management
Processes
Sensemaking
Human
Errors
Figure 2.
The terrain of
(in)effectiveness
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to the work on crisis incubation as outlined by Turner (1976, 1978), along with his
framing of the management practices as part of this process (Turner, 1994).
The first of these relates to the role that people play in the crisis incubation process.
By implication, this raises a challenge for the HR function around its abilities to address
the processes of crisis incubation. In some respects, HRM could be seen as the neglected
functional area within crisis management, despite the fact that it has the potential to
shape the recruitment, selection and development of staff, the training of crisis
management teams, and a range of activities around human resource development.
The threats from insiders – both as the perpetrators of an “attack” on the organisation and
as a point of vulnerability that can contribute to systems failure – should be a central issue
of concern for the HR function. Instead, many organisations create an artificial boundary
between the HR and corporate security functions. This Balkanisation of key activities
has the potential to lead to the compartmentalisation of issues and creates barriers
to effective flows of information, especially around early warnings of failure or
misbehaviours. Ideally, the HR and security functions within organisations should
reflect the symbiotic nature of their relationships when it comes to dealing with
insider or outsider threats and misbehaviours. This would require the HR profession
to ensure that personnel security is a more central component of its own activities and
train HR professionals accordingly.
A second element arising from the issues raised in Figure 2 relates to the interaction
between the HR function and the practices of the more “toxic” forms of management.
This is due to the role of narcissistic and other dysfunctional behaviours within the
management function and the role that these individuals can play in shaping
organisational cultures, misbehaviours, and control mechanisms. Our discussion will turn
later to highlight a range of concerns around the so-called “dark triad” of behavioural
types (Jonason et al., 2012; Paulhus and Williams, 2002) that have the clear potential to
generate crisis conditions within organisations. The discussion will focus particular
attention on the ways in which these behavioural issues have the potential to generate
both violating- and error-producing conditions and, at the same time, allow for the erosion
of organisational controls. Of particular importance here will be a consideration of the
work of Reason in framing the processes associated with the creation of latent and active
errors and violations in organisations (Reason, 1990a, b). Finally, the paper will consider
the systems perspectives around the production of ineffectiveness, the role of negative
innovation practices, the generation of emergent properties within systems, and the
challenges facing organisations in terms of attempts to manage uncertainty.
The centrality of human resources
The first issue of note concerns the role of human resources in the management of
performance and the potential it generates for crisis incubation. People are central to the
ways in which the various logics of effectiveness are framed and implemented – both at an
operational and a strategic level – but they also play a major role in the generation of
ineffectiveness through exploitative and inadequate line management practices, poor
decision making, insider threats, human error, and a range of managerial misbehaviours
(see, amongst others, Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Burnett, 1998; Carmeli and
Schaubroeck, 2006; Eriksson andMcConnell, 2011; Pauchant andMitroff, 1990; Woodford,
2012). For many organisations, the issues are framed around deviant behaviours without
considering how organisational logistics and practices can contribute to dysfunctional
behaviours. The projection of blame onto individual operators within a system invariably
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masks the role that management, and a set of wider organisational processes, can play in
shaping those behaviours by eroding organisational controls or by direct actions. One
criticism that has been raised concerning the nature of misbehaviours and violations in
the workplace is that managerial misbehaviours often go unpunished compared to lower
level organisational members (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). A further factor here is the
creation and sustaining of a set of flawed managerial assumptions around the way that
the system functions in practice. The gap between these assumptions and the reality of the
“system at work” has been a key factor in shaping organisational failures (Mitroff et al.,
1989; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Reason, 1997; Turner, 1994).
The HR function can also play a significant role in helping to shape team and individual
performance during a crisis (Smith, 2000) and in facilitating effective organisational
learning in its aftermath (Smith and Elliott, 2007). Whilst there has been a considerable
amount of research in the area of dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000;
Teece, 2014; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003) the application of those concepts to
organisational crises – in terms of both causal and responsive processes – remains an
under-researched phenomena. In particular, there is a need to understand how crisis-related
capabilities are framed, what the main processes are around the development of those
capabilities, and the implementation of the resulting capabilities frameworks within the
context of crisis management teams. This process touches upon such issues as: knowledge
management (and specifically, the capture and dissemination of tacit knowledge held by
the individual that is critical to the performance of the organisation); the development of the
dynamic capabilities required to both prevent and respond to crisis events; and the
minimisation of threats from insiders (Smith, 2000, 2004; Snell and Youndt, 1995; Turner
and Makhija, 2006). In some respects, the work on high-reliability organisations (LaPorte
and Consolini, 1991; Roberts et al., 1994; Sutcliffe, 2011) could be seen as offering
considerable potential to extend the work on dynamic capabilities into the area of crisis
management. Whilst high-reliability theory may be contested (Perrow, 2009; Sagan, 1993),
it has been applied in a number of settings and there is some potential in exploring the
implications of the approach within more general performance settings (Roberts et al., 2001;
Shrivastava et al., 2009; Sutcliffe, 2011). Again, this is an area where HRM has a potentially
significant role to play.
HRM should seek to play a more integrated “life-cycle” role in dealing with issues of
effectiveness and performance through a focus on recruitment, selection, job design,
staff development, security, and performance monitoring. A focus on the human aspects
of reliability and the nature of a dynamic response to threats and vulnerabilities is key in
this regard. In order to achieve this, HRM would need to deliver on its strategic promise
around HR development (rather than maintaining a skewed focus on performance)
and the practical implementation of “life-long” learning in achieving effectiveness.
A key aspect of this process concerns the development of crisis management team
capabilities and the associated training and exercising that is needed to support such
processes. Again, this is a potentially important role for human resource professionals to
add to organisational capabilities around effective performance. At present, this is not
something that forms a significant part of HRM custom and practice and does not have
the presence within the research community that it should. What work has been
undertaken has pointed to the important role that HRM can play in the development of
crisis preparedness (Sheaffer and Mano-Negrin, 2003) but, ultimately, HR will need to
display its strengths as an enabler of organisational strategy and its abilities to help
develop the capabilities that organisations need to both prevent and deal with the task
demands of crisis.
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This challenge also raises a core question about the effectiveness of the HR profession
itself and its abilities to deliver on such a strategic agenda within organisations. Some
commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the profession is in a state of crisis
(Thompson, 2011), and this could be a significant factor in shaping the processes around
organisational effectiveness. Thompson observes that:
HRM is indeed in trouble, both theoretically and practically. Its core claims and professional
self-image have become so entwined with the human capital narrative and the
performance pot of gold at the end of the best practice rainbow for it to be any other
way – (Thompson, 2011).
If HR has such a potentially fatal flaw within its own theoretical underpinnings then it is
unlikely to be able to contribute to debates around effectiveness in anymeaningful manner.
There is, therefore, a clear dilemma for the HR community in the shareholder-driven
culture that Thompson describes, where the focus on performance has resulted in the
dominance of short termism within decision making and where the financial imperative
has become the dominant measure of performance.
A core question here might centre on how HR contributes the expertise aimed at
developing the dynamic capabilities that are needed within crisis management. This is
especially problematic when the profession itself does not emphasise those processes in its
own training and development programmes. A brief examination of accredited masters
degree programmes in the UK illustrates that there is little coverage of risk and crisis
issues facing organisations beyond tangential coverage in modules on ethical behaviours
and industrial relations[1]. The one exception was the University of Strathclyde that
offered an optional module in “The Psychology of Risk Management”[2]. There is an
argument for increasing the centrality of HR in developing a crisis prepared culture within
organisations and ensuring that is done in partnership with all employees and not
just senior management. As if to reinforce the centrality of risk within HR, Thompson
and colleagues have also observed that there is a strong relationship between HR
practices and organisational controls (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Thompson and
van den Broek, 2010).
For such controls to be effective they need to be designed in such a way that they
reflect our understanding of behaviours and the factors that shape them. These
controls also have to be consistently tested and done in a way that challenges
the assumptions that managers have about the ways in which those controls function.
There is relatively little discussion within the general HR literature around these issues.
Much of the discussion around insider threats, for example – and one might argue this
is a key area of relevance to HRM – has been led by work emanating from within
computer science and accounting (Berry et al., 2009; Colwill, 2009; Kraemer and
Carayon, 2007; Power and Forte, 2006) and by the Centre for the Protection of National
Infrastructure in the UK. There are many instances where the controls have failed
to prevent a trusted employee from causing harm, either by reputational damage,
information theft, financial loss, or even by violent acts (Ambrose et al., 2002; Bentley
et al., 2014; Brown, 2005; Day, 2007; Kramer and Heuer, 2007; Terry, 2013). Even the
most “secure” organisations have proved to have problems in this regard and there are
numerous examples of how even the security services and the military have failed to
identify and act on insider threats, leading up to the more recent problems around
Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden (Harding, 2014; Hayden, 2014; Keefe, 2006;
Lucas, 2014). As we have already observed, few academic programmes deal with these
issues in a systematic way.
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From an effectiveness perspective, it could be argued that notions of “control” have
to represent a cradle-to-grave approach across the HR function and that it requires an
integrated approach towards dealing with the effective recruitment, selection, training,
and exiting strategies for all employees. It could also be argued that the HR function is
ill-prepared to deal with these task demands and that a significant programme of staff
development would be needed to make certain that the HR function was itself effective
in this regard. The threats from insiders is one that both highlights the vulnerabilities
of the HR function within organisational effectiveness and the limitations of control
systems. It also highlights its potential as a source of risk that could impair the
performance of the organisation as a whole. Insider threats also raise another key issue
around the toxic triangle, namely, how do we effectively identify and manage those
colleagues who have damaging personality characteristics and who hold senior
managerial positions? These are the employees who are often the most neglected part
of this discourse.
Coming to a darkened workplace near you? Personality disorders and
crisis
[…]. there are at least two ways that a personality characteristic can be called “dark” – in
its nature or in its effects […]. We can claim that a personality concept is dark if it has
a particularly malevolent character – individuals who have high elevations on the construct
are motivated (consciously or unconsciously) to harm others (or themselves). On the other
hand, a characteristic that has no particularly malevolent content could still have
noxious consequences. […]. Harm, of some kind, is almost a necessary consequence of the
label dark – (Spain et al., 2014, p. S50).
The creation of harm in the workplace – whether by accident or intention – would
normally be considered as a property of an inefficient organisation. Harm could be
generated in various ways: by insiders with malicious intent; by outsiders who seek to
cause harm; by the actions or inactions of managers who create an unsafe working
environment; or by accidental causes which arise from failures in control systems.
In virtually all of these cases, the interactions between people and processes are central
to the conditions in which harm occurs. It could also be argued that the human resource
function should play a role in seeking to prevent such harms from occurring, especially
where they involve malevolent individuals, the training of staff around risk and
security, and the development of a culture that facilitates the capture of information
relating to early warnings and near misses. A consideration of a range of accidents and
systems failures would suggest, however, that there are severe limitations to the
abilities of the HR function to deal with these problems. This is especially the case when
considering extreme cases of misbehaviour and the associated threats from insiders.
The context in which these harms can be generated in the organisation can also be
framed in terms of Padilla et al.’s (2007) “toxic triangle”, where organisational leaders,
especially those with negative and exploitative characteristics, can operate in an
environment that allows them to manipulate and exploit those who work for them.
Organisations are only as secure as their human resources allow them to be.
Weakness can exist as a function of the integrity and professionalism of those people
within the organisation. It has been suggested, for example, that some 48 per cent of the
data breaches within companies are caused by insiders (Verizon RISK Team and US
Secret Service, 2010). The most recent examples of such breaches are provided by the
data leaks carried out by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden who both worked in
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highly secure and trusted environments (Gurnow, 2014; Madar, 2013). In the Snowden
case, this was an individual who had supposedly been vetted by his organisations and
who was then able to by-pass multiple layers of controls in order to download and save
a considerable amount of sensitive information to the press. Whilst Snowden is seen by
some as a hero and whistle-blower (Harding, 2014), he has also been heavily criticised in
government circles in both the UK and the USA (Hayden, 2014; Lucas, 2014;
Terry, 2013). Of course, one might also question the initial government decisions
taken around surveillance that seem to have prompted Snowden’s actions in the
first place. In particular, concerns could be expressed around the ethics of large-scale
government surveillance programmes in a democratic society. One might also raise
concerns around the motivations and abilities of the intelligence community to make
sense of the information that they have collected, as well as the actions of governments
in justifying the need for that data collection on such a scale (Brenner, 2013; Greewald,
2014; Tucker, 2014). These issues are, however, beyond the scope of this paper. It is also
worth highlighting the fact that governments are not the only ones who engage
in surveillance. Organisations who engage in the covert surveillance of its employees
can also find their actions to be ethically problematic and there is a difficult balance
to be struck between effective security and excessive intrusion. Again, this is an
issue that is central to the interactions between people and processes around
organisational effectiveness.
The underlying motivations for insiders are often expressed through the acronym
MICE: money, ideology, coercion, and ego (Burkett, 2013). These drivers are often seen
to lie at the core of explaining the various motivations of individuals to betray their
organisations or even their countries. Of course Snowden was not the first case of a
security professional leaking information to third parties. In the UK, the so-called
Cambridge Five and the spy George Blake are well-known examples of security
personnel who leaked sensitive and secret information to foreign powers (Hermiston,
2013; Kerr, 1996; Macintyre, 2014) and there was also a number of other alleged
defections (Turchetti, 2003). Even the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic
bomb was subject to information leaks (Herken, 1980; Picknett et al., 2005). What
differentiates the Snowden and Manning leaks is the scale of the information that was
removed and the relative ease by which it could be stored on electronic media.
Changes in technology have also proved to be a critical factor in allowing
information to be collected on “persons of interest” but they have also generated a new
set of vulnerabilities for organisations around cyber attacks (Brenner, 2013). Cyber
attacks have been carried out by corporate insiders, although much of this does not
receive coverage by the mainstream media[3]. These insiders have invariably been
recruited, selected, vetted, and trained by the organisation and, as stated earlier, the
human resources function have a role to play in this process. The EU is the most
“wired” part of the world, the source of a considerable amount of wealth, and with
several jurisdictions for regulators to work over. As such, it is one of the most attractive
geographical locations for cyber crime. For cyber criminals, the physical location of the
asset to be stolen is not longer a constraint, as proximity is no longer needed to gain
access to the information source. Location is important in terms of accessing the
organisation’s local network but in many cases even that might not require proximity.
Where location does become important for cyber “criminals” is in terms of allowing
unfettered access to the network whilst at the same time, avoiding the risks of detection
and arrest by law enforcement. It is not a surprise, therefore, that cyber attacks are
often launched from countries that provide adequate access to networks but do not
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have strong levels of international collaboration around enforcement. Organised crime
within Russia serves as an example of that activity (Holmes, 2008; Volkov, 2002),
although there are considerable complexities and variations in the ways that organised
crime operates in a global environment (Varese, 2011). In some cases, crime groups
have also coerced organisational insiders through processes of social engineering as a
means of gathering the “hostile” surveillance or details of the security protocols
necessary to mount attacks (Colwill, 2009; Mitnick, 2011; Roy Sarkar, 2010).
This range of issues highlights the challenges that can arise out of the actions of
individuals who have malevolent intent. These reflect the challenges that exist between
the environmental threats facing the organisation, the role of internal leadership in
mitigating (or generating) those threats, and the actions of other organisational members
who act as followers or opponents of the dominant organisational culture. Figure 3
highlights some of the issues that emerge out of the interactions between some of the
elements that relate to them. The issues highlighted are not meant to be inclusive of all of
the characteristics that are associated with this toxic triangle but simply to highlight some
of the problems that could very easily conspire to erode the development of organisational
effectiveness. In this setting, management also has the potential to become the author of
its ownmisfortune as many of the elements associated with a failure can be traced back to
a range of dysfunctional behaviours that are generated by those leaders within the
organisation who display “dark triad” ( Jonason et al., 2012; Paulhus and Williams, 2002)
personality characteristics.
Research has highlighted the range of narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic
behaviours that exist in organisations and the impact that they can have on
organisational performance (Babiak and Hare, 2006; Campbell et al., 2011; Jonason et al.,
2014; Padilla et al., 2007; Smith and Lilienfeld, 2013). These so-called “dark triad”
personality traits are typified by such characteristics (amongst other negative traits)
as: a lack of empathy, a willingness to manipulate others (for self-betterment),
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antagonism, and a belief in their own superiority (Conger, 1990; Paulhus and Williams,
2002; Spain et al., 2014). In such cases they are considered to be especially harmful to
the organisation given the positional power of the individuals concerned and are
typified by:
The systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the
legitimate interest of the organisation by undermining and/or sabotaging the organisation’s
goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction
of subordinates – (Einarsen et al., 2007, p. 208).
Clearly, these traits exist across the range of employees within the organisation. However,
recent work has considered their prevalence amongst organisational leaders (Babiak and
Hare, 2006). Concerns have also been expressed around the impact that these individuals
can have in their search for power and self-promotion and how their own selfish agendas
can impact on leadership strategies and organisational performance (Furnham et al., 2012;
Jonason et al., 2012; Khoo and Burch, 2008).
The leadership styles of senior managers could have profound implications for
effectiveness as they are held to translate into organisational structures and processes
(Kets De Vries and Miller, 1984) and, in the case of weak managers, have also been seen
to result in the appointments of staff who share the same characteristics (South and
Matejka, 1990). One might also argue that narcissistic managers may look to appoint
subordinates who will fuel their own needs, thereby creating a particular culture that
would be self-reinforcing and therefore could ultimately be prone to crisis. A key
implication here is that the temporal dynamics of these processes are important – some
narcissists, for example, may prove to be constructive at certain points in time and
within certain environmental settings as their self-serving behaviours may also
support wider short-term organisational goals (Stein, 2013). There are also problems
with those individuals who display sycophantic behaviours at lower levels of the
organisation, but who then rise through the organisational hierarchy as a consequence
(Pech and Slade, 2007). This is despite the fact that these individuals may sometimes be
ill-suited to the tasks that they are required to undertake – what matters is their
willingness to comply with the views of their leaders, irrespective of the validity of
those views. The result is the creation of an organisational culture in which there is no
effective challenge to the dominant mindset within the organisation. Ultimately this can
create a toxic environment that runs through all levels of the organisational hierarchy
where the decision makers suffer from the same form of paradigm blindness and where
there is little, if any, scope for an alternative view, and which has the potential to
incubate crisis. The result is often a form of resistance amongst the workforce which
helps to generate the potential for crisis and failure.
The HR function within organisations should play a major role in identifying and
acting upon such aberrant forms of behaviour. However, the history of organisational
crises has illustrated that many of these organisational misbehaviours go unchecked.
Research has investigated a range of these negative characteristics in such diverse
areas as “celebrity”, politics, banking (Boddy, 2011; Owen, 2008; Owen and Davidson,
2009; Pettman, 2010; Stein, 2000; Young and Pinsky, 2006), and even academia
(Kornfeld, 2012; List et al., 2001; Parker, 2014). This is especially the case were
self-promotion and an increased media profile are seen as a means of achieving
the positional power or outcomes that such individuals crave (Brunell et al., 2011;
Jensen et al., 2002). Social media and electronic communications have also fuelled the
opportunities that such narcissists have to promote their own self-importance
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(Bergman et al., 2011; Ong et al., 2011). It has also provided the opportunities for
individuals to engage in new forms of misbehaviours around cyber harassment and
cyber loafing (Henle et al., 2009; Whitty and Carr, 2006; Wishart, 2014).
The combination of social media and dark personality characteristics is a potentially
toxic combination and one that clearly has the potential to harm an organisation’s
reputation. Social media has also been a factor in shaping a set of deviant behaviours
around child abuse (most notably through grooming), radicalisation, and a range of
other unacceptable behaviours (Kierkegaard, 2008; Whittle et al., 2013) and these have
created an additional set of concerns for those organisations and agencies who
seek to prevent such abuse occurring (Conway and McInerney, 2008; Torok, 2013;
Whittle et al., 2013).
The recruitment of people with dark triad personalities has also highlighted the
need to attempt an identification of these characteristics early in the process; and this is
more pronounced in some key professions where the potential for harm is high
(perhaps most notably medicine) (Knights and Kennedy, 2007; van Mook et al., 2010).
Within the UK, the manner in which so-called “problem doctors” (Donaldson, 1994;
Rosenthal, 1997) has become an issue within healthcare resulted in a major government
initiative around the management of adverse events (DoH, 2000, 2001, 2003). Much of
this concern was around finding systems-based approaches to determining the
effective management of patient treatment and the reduction of human errors and
violations (Reason, 2001; Redfern et al., 2000; Rosenthal, 1987, 1995). A particular case
that had widespread effects was that of Dr Harold Shipman who murdered in the order
of 215[4] of his patients before being apprehended by police. Shipman was able to
exploit multiple failures in the control systems that were in place around prescribing
drugs, the signing of death certificates, and the difficulties of monitoring and
controlling single-handed GP practices (Sitford, 2000; Smith, 2002a, b).
The ability to identify and by-pass organisational defences is a key factor in the
strategies of the malevolent individual to cause harm in organisations. This applies to
third parties who seek to attack the organisation from outside as well as to those
insiders who cause harm by either accidental or intentional effects. Figure 4 sets out
Reason’s so-called “Swiss Cheese” model, in which he uses the analogy to highlight the
gaps that exist within organisational defences. These gaps can either be generated by
the latent conditions of managers – by failing to maintain and test defences, or by the
generation of an organisational culture that allows for lax practices – or by the direct
actions of individuals. In the case of Shipman, it was a combination of these factors that
allowed him to overcome the various procedures that were in place to protect patients.
It was the trust given to doctors that was instrumental in allowing him to kill without
detection over such a long period of time. That notion of trust was manifest in both the
perceptions of both patients and colleagues who would struggle to conceive of a doctor
as being capable of murder, and this worked in combination with the procedures that
were in place to control the prescription and retention of potentially dangerous drugs to
allow him to stockpile diamorphine and use it to kill his patients. Given that Shipman
had been found guilty of obtaining prescription drugs for his own use early in his
career (Smith, 2002a), then such a level of trust would, in hindsight, seem to be
somewhat misplaced.
Healthcare is not the only organisational sector that has experienced problems in
terms of the threats from insiders. There have been several examples where individuals
have been involved in workplace violence, sabotage, data theft, the identification of
organisational vulnerabilities, as well as a range of attempts to defraud organisations
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(Ambrose et al., 2002; Bentley et al., 2014; Dhillon and Moores, 2001; Greener, 2006).
The problems concerning the presentation of company accounts at Tesco in September
2014 was also a result of the actions of insiders – in this case, it was alleged that they
were senior managers who conspired to make the accounts appear more favourable
(Butler and Treanor, 2014; Pratley, 2014; Wood and Farrell, 2014). The implications
associated with this range of organisational misbehaviours are considerable and it
illustrates the processes by which effectiveness can be impaired. First, it can be
damaged by the direct, intentional, and malevolent actions of individuals who
ultimately seek to cause harm; and second, by the accidental effects caused by the
actions of individuals where the emergent consequences of those behaviours cause
harm by reputational damage (Spain et al., 2014). In one case, the generation of harms is
intentional, and in the other it is an emergent effect arising out of misbehaviours and
unprofessional behaviours where harm is a secondary consequence. The challenge for
HRM is to manage the range of potential problems arising from such misbehaviours
within the workplace and to develop the dynamic capabilities within the HR function
that would allow it to deal with the task demands generated by such misbehaviours.
Conclusions
The pattern which connects […]. is a metapattern, a pattern of patterns. More often than not
we fail to see it […]. we have been trained to think of patterns as fixed affairs. The truth is that
the right way to begin to think about the pattern which connects is as a dance of interacting
parts, secondarily pegged down by various sorts of physical limits and by habits, and by the
naming of states and component entities – (Bateson, cited in Goleman, 1985, p. 7).
The management of uncertainty is an important element of the determination of
effectiveness. The manner in which organisations can incorporate the various forms of
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knowledge into their strategy is a key element in this process. The categorisation
of knowledge used by former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld is a useful
starting point in this context. Rumsfeld argued that there are the core things that we
know and understand (the knowns), the things that we know that we do not know and
understand (the known unknowns), and those issues that we haven’t even considered
as problematic (the unknown unknowns) (Rumsfeld, 2002, 2011). The development of
organisational effectiveness ultimately requires managers to recognise the limitations
of their own knowledge when making decisions – that is, to reflect on the parameters
and significance of the known unknowns whilst acknowledging that even the knowns
are often spatially and temporally bounded. In some cases, what we think of as a “known”
phenomena (and, therefore, by implication understood) or a course of action may well not
work in a different context. Even within those elements that we understand, the potential
for emergence is a key factor in the behaviour (and performance) of socio-technical
systems. This is particularly the case around the interactions between innovation and risk.
As organisations innovate they change the parameters of the system and therefore
generate the potential for emergent conditions. In Rumsfeld’s terms, these incorporate
more of the unknowns (both known and unknown) and have the potential to create
new conditions for the organisation to respond to. This movement into areas where
the knowledge base is less robust is an essential component of the development of
organisations over time but it also generates some challenges around the ways in which it
generates additional risks.
The “dance of interacting parts” as outlined by Bateson is an apt way of describing
many of the process elements that take place around the creation and erosion of
effectiveness. The failure to manage the uncertainty that is inherent in the decision-making
process is a key element of the generation of organisational failures and one that is
exacerbated by the interactions between people and processes. Where the performance of
people is rendered problematic as a function of their dark triad personality characteristics,
and where the processes around control are flawed, then this uncertainty is increased.
As noted earlier, and as a response to Sparrow and Cooper’s (2014) call for a more
multi-disciplinary approach towards dealing with the range of challenges facing
organisational effectiveness, this paper has sought to outline elements of the darker side
of organisational effectiveness by focusing on a range of issues that have the potential to
move the organisation into a state of crisis and which also have the issues of people and
performance at their core. However, there is a need to add a note of caution to any calls
towards a multi-disciplinary approach. The Academy needs to ensure that it does not
engage in a process of academic grazing – where researchers move beyond their domain
of knowledge and simply capture ideas and concepts from other disciplines without
grounding those concepts in the debates and challenges of their host discipline. Many of
the real-world problems facing organisations require research that transcends academic
silos and seeks to analyse the problem through different analytical lenses. Herein lies the
paradox for our own “effectiveness” as a community of researchers. How do we deal with
the demands for a multi-disciplinary approach whilst ensuring that we have sufficient
fluency in other disciplines to be effective in working with those concepts.
This is particularly problematic in the performance-based environment of the
Research Excellence Framework in the UK (and similar programmes elsewhere) where
the demands to publish papers in highly ranked journals can have the effect of stifling
innovation and theoretical development around multi-level issues. Multi-disciplinary
research is slow and often laborious. It requires a commitment to life-long learning that
is often preached by universities but often not fully encouraged within their own staff.
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If we are to make a contribution to the problems facing organisations, then the
Academy itself must change in order to produce the next generation of scholars who
are capable of working in such an environment. This Journal has a major contribution
to make in the development of concepts and challenges that will shape those debates,
but only if we see effectiveness as a double-edge issue where the potential for failure is
closely related to the search for high levels of performance. By concentrating on the
latter we might be unwittingly be generating the former.
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Notes
1. The content of 20 masters programmes in HRM was examined at random to see if there was
any explicit coverage of issues of risk (including health and safety) or crisis. Only Strathclyde
University had a full optional module in risk management that was evident from the course
descriptors for its HRM programme.
2. See the course web page at: www.strath.ac.uk/hrm/courses/postgraduate/pg-fulltime/structure/
3. These were points made by members of the US and EU security and police agencies who
made the comments under Chatham House rules. As a consequence they cannot have the
comments attributed to them.
4. It is doubtful that the true scale of Shipman’s crimes will ever be accurately known due to the
time period involved. It is possible that he killed in excess of 215 patients.
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